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Knowledge is Power:  
The Criminal Law, Openness  
and Privacy 
Scott C. Hutchison* 
I. THEMES FROM THE PRINCIPAL PAPERS 
1. Information and the Relationship Between Government and the 
Governed 
Citizens deserve to know, and in some cases need to know, what 
their governments — including their courts — are up to.  
Governments like to be able to, and in some situations need to be 
able to gather information about what “the governed” are up to.  
This mutual thirst for knowledge is driven by more than idle curiosi-
ty. Sir Frances Bacon’s famous aphorism that “knowledge is power”
1
 
explains why the control of information defines the relationship between 
the state and the subject. The balance of power between the two is in 
many ways a function of, and can be measured by, the ability of each to 
control the flow of information between them. 
The substantive themes of the two principal papers
2
 — openness 
and privacy — underscore the point that in many ways the success of a 
democracy can be assessed by how easily the subject can access infor-
mation about the operations of the state, and by how constrained the 
state is in gathering information about the subject. The administration of 
                                                                                                                                
*
  Partner, Stockwoods LLP. 
1
 Bacon is generally credited with this quotation. It has been reported that this motto sits 
over the office of John Poindexter, the American official responsible for the new U.S. Federal 
Government “Information Awareness Office” (an Orwellian institution if ever there was one). See 
W. Safire, “You are a Suspect” New York Times (13 December 2002). 
2
 A. Young, “Unreasonable Search and Seizure: Privacy Revisited” Paper; D. Paciocco, 
“When Open Courts Meet Closed Government” both delivered at 2004 Constitutional Cases, 
Osgoode Hall Professional Development Program (15 April 2005) Toronto and reproduced in this 
volume, at 385. 
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criminal justice, especially in times of national crisis, tests the outer 
limits of these democratic metrics.  
There are, however, elements of the administration of criminal jus-
tice that for obvious reasons must take place in secret, even in a demo-
cratic state, particularly at the investigative stage.
3
  
In recent times the fear generated by an unknown enemy with un-
known resources rightly leaves state authorities anxious to preserve 
whatever advantage they might enjoy in combating terror. To the extent 
that the value of information can be compromised by disclosure, there is 
an understandable desire to keep such information secret. The gravity of 
the perceived consequences associated with disclosure will sometimes 
overtake careful consideration of the likelihood of such danger ever 
actually manifesting itself. Indeed, the consequences of disclosure may 
sometimes justify secrecy at a lower threshold than might normally be 
demanded. 
Similarly, the state’s desire to gather otherwise “private” infor-
mation to prevent or prosecute crime, especially crime that challenges 
the existence of the community as a whole, is the state’s most compel-
ling justification for trenching upon the privacy of citizens. Another 
aphorism — one overused in recent times — captures cleverly the in 
terrorem argument that national security provides an unanswerable 
justification for broadened, unrestrained state authority: “the constitu-
tion is not a suicide pact.”
4
 On this facile theory the continued existence 
of the democratic state is a value superior to otherwise defining ele-
ments of democratic life. 
At the end of the day the test of a democratic legal system is not 
whether it permits secret proceedings, or gives the state the power to 
discover private information: obviously for any sovereign authority to 
                                                                                                                                
3
 Even the landmark “openness” case of Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, 
[1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129 acknowledged that there had to be recognition of the need 
for some pre-charge judicial proceedings to be secret for at least a time. 
4
 D. Corn, “The “Suicide Pact” Mystery Who Coined the Phrase? Justice Goldberg or Jus-
tice Jackson?” from the online magazine Slate.com online at: <www.slate.msn.com/id/2060342/> 
(last accessed 15 June 2005) sets out the competing claims of Robert Jackson and Arthur Goldberg 
JJ. for credit for the expression. (Jackson J. warned against allowing the constitution to become a 
“suicide pact” in 1949 in Terminiello v. City Of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, at 37 (1949), while Goldberg 
J. warned that “[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a 
suicide pact.” In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, at 160 (1963). Contrary to the 
popular use of the quoted expression, neither case stands for the proposition that the democratic 
values cease to control when the state is threatened.  
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function in a meaningful way it must be able do these things, at least 
some of the time. Our focus should be on the procedures in place to 
require the justification of these two departures from the (unattainable) 
democratic ideal of the perfectly unintrusive, transparent state.
5
 
I tend to the view that the Supreme Court of Canada has, by and 
large, struck an appropriate balance in matters related to the flow of 
information between and about state and individual. I think, for exam-
ple, that the Court’s response to the “closed-court” presumption advo-
cated by the Crown in Vancouver Sun
6
 was correct. We have a very 
specific conception of what judicial proceedings are supposed to look 
like, and openness (or at least presumed openness) is an essential ele-
ment of such proceedings. Again, some departures from this ideal are 
inevitable: what matters is our commitment to the presumption of open-
ness and the processes by which any departure from that presumption is 





consistent with the Court’s previous jurisprudence and continue to ap-
proach issues of privacy and search in a principled, responsible manner. 
Section 8 guarantees only a reasonable expectation of privacy, a stand-
ard which requires an internal balancing of the state’s interest in the 
prompt and expeditious investigation of crime against the democratic 
ideal of an unintrusive government. Too broad a reading of reasonable 
expectation of privacy runs the risk of creating too many hurdles to 
investigations without significantly increasing the scope of democrati-
cally meaningful privacy. 
2.  Inspiring a Culture of Constitutional Respect  
In addition to their examination of the role that information plays in 
defining the relationship between state and citizen, the two principal 
papers share a further theme: the importance of a proper constitutional 
indoctrination for state officials responsible for the invocation or execu-
tion of processes that have the potential to infringe constitutional values.  
                                                                                                                                
5
 The justification approach is articulated more thoroughly and ably by M. Ignatieff in 
The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
6
 Vancouver Sun (Re), [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 515.  
7
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129. 
8
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308. 
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The danger they properly identify is that state officials, who normal-
ly take the rule of law as a core value, develop a laxity around, or worse 
yet, a contempt for, the constitutional rights of the individuals they are 
investigating. 
I agree with the principal papers that more must be done to inculcate 
in every state actor a sophisticated appreciation of, and respect for, con-
stitutional rights. I would offer only two points to supplement their 
comments. First, I would see national security enforcement as just about 
the last place to start the process of improving the culture of the en-
forcement community. A project of improving constitutional respect 
must begin “from the ground up,” with routine policing rather than with 
the high stakes world of national security. Second, I would suggest that 
part of the project has to be to make the constitutional law governing 
investigations more coherent and accessible. The intricate, finely spun 
web of constitutional limitations developed over the last two decades 
has left police with a sort of “constitutional fatigue” which can easily 
evolve into contempt. Brighter lines (or at least some signal that such 
lines are being attempted) will enhance constitutional respect by police 
and other similarly positioned state actors. 
II. OPENNESS AND THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIME 
Few advocates would go looking for a brief to defend secret court 
proceedings. The moral and doctrinal deck is stacked against any party 
trying to encourage a court in this country to conduct judicial business 
covertly. From at least the time of the Court of Star Chamber under the 
Stuarts, secrecy has been synonymous with abuse and tyranny. As Pro-
fessor Paciocco observes, this abhorrence of the covert administration of 
justice is in some ways peculiar to the common law tradition. 
But secrecy is sometimes legitimate and necessary to ensure that the 
administration of justice (including the investigation of crime) is able to 
operate effectively. As the majority said in Michaud
9
 (justifying the rule 
in wiretap cases which substitutes presumptive permanent secrecy for 
                                                                                                                                
9
 Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 85, 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 51. 
Michaud was not, strictly speaking, an open court case, but rather a case examining the standard for 
access to the sealed packet filed on a wiretap application. While the formal ratio of the case might 
thereby be distinguished, it is hard to say that the underlying rationale of the case carries no weight 
in the openness debate.  
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the usual rule of openness) “[t]he reality of modern law enforcement is 
that police authorities must frequently act under the cloak of secrecy to 
effectively counteract the activities of sophisticated criminal enterpris-
es.” 
How the presumption of openness is to be set aside is very much 
driven by the context of the particular case. The Supreme Court of Can-
ada and parliament have consistently called for a context sensitive ap-
proach to openness. In Sierra Club Iacobucci J. emphasized that these 
principles “must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged” 
in the particular case.
10
 It is intended to be an “adaptable” test used to 




There are at least eight different contexts (and arguably eight differ-
ent tests) for how openness can be set aside: 
 





 (the most demanding stan-
dard); 
(ii) Temporary trial publication deferrals to Protect Fair Trial Interest 
(Dagenais); 
(iii) Permanent trial bans to protect Privacy Interests of Complaining 
Witnesses (C.B.C. v. New Brunswick);
14
 
(iv) Automatic trial and pre-trial publication deferrals to protect privacy 
and fair trial interests of accused persons (bail publication bans 
(section 517);
15
 preliminary inquiry temporary bans (section 539);
16
 
proceedings not in the presence of a jury (section 648); 
                                                                                                                                
10
 Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 522, at para. 38 (emphasis added). The same need for a context sensitive approach was articu-
lated in Mentuck [2001] S.C. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, at paras. 32-34. 
11
 Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, at para. 28, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 515. 
12
 R. v. Mentuck, supra, note 10. 
13
 R. v. O.N.E., [2001] S.C.J. No. 74, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478. 
14
 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 
38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480. 
15
 Global Communications Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1984), 10 C.C.C. (3d) 97 
(Ont. C.A.). 
16
 R. v. Banville, [1983] N.B.J. No. 110, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 312 (Q.B.). 
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(vi) In camera orders for investigative hearings into terrorism offences 
(section 83.28 and Vancouver Sun);
18
 
(vii) Presumptive permanent sealing and secrecy mandated for authori-
zation materials for both executed and pre-execution wiretap ap-
plications (section 187 and Michaud)
19
 





There is a real challenge for those seeking to defeat the openness 
presumption for court proceedings that take place during the investiga-
tive phase. Clearly the onus must be on the party seeking secrecy. But 
almost by definition, knowledge is imperfect at the investigative stage. 
Indeed, it is often the lack of knowledge or intelligence about the facts 
that compels the desire for secrecy.  
In Vancouver Sun the Court appeared to accept the need for an ap-
proach to the question of when judicial investigative hearings should be 
held in camera that acknowledged the problem of an “information defi-
cit” at the investigative stage. The majority held that such hearings 
should be presumptively public but, applying an adaptable, context 
sensitive approach, held the test for confidentiality had to be modified to 
recognize the realities of the procedure in question: 
In applying the Dagenais/Mentuck approach to the decision to hold the 
investigative judicial hearing in camera, judges should expect to be 
presented with evidence credible on its face of the anticipated risks 
that an open inquiry would present, including evidence of the 
information expected to be revealed by the witness. Even though the 
evidence may reveal little more than reasonable expectations, this is 
often all that can be expected at that stage of the process and the 
presiding judge, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test in a contextual 
manner, would be entitled to proceed on the basis of evidence that 
                                                                                                                                
17
 Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 522. 
18
 Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 515. 
19
 Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 85, 3 S.C.R. 3. 
20
 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2003] O.J. No. 4006, 67 O.R. (3d) 577 
(C.A.). 
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As the court said in another context, such an assessment should be in-




III. PRIVACY  
I would urge that Tessling is not, as Professor Young argues, a case 
that sees the Court pay “lip-service” to the sanctity of the home or a case 
in which the Court has opened the door to constitutionally immunized 
invasive state use of technology.  
Privacy is itself “a broad and somewhat evanescent concept.”
23
 The 
Court, in the context of Charter jurisprudence, has over the last two 
decades developed a purposive and flexible approach to identifying the 
privacy interests protected at a constitutional level. As Sopinka J. ob-
served in Evans, “… the Court must inquire into the purposes of s. 8 in 
determining whether or not a particular form of police conduct consti-
tutes a ‘search’ for constitutional purposes.”
24
 The inquiry is contextual 
and requires a consideration of all the relevant circumstances: “[A] 
reasonable expectation of privacy is to be determined on the basis of the 
totality of the circumstances.”
25
  
This purposive and flexible approach to constitutional privacy 
draws heavily upon the analytical framework and rationale put forward 
                                                                                                                                
21
 Supra, note 18, at para. 43 (emphasis added). 
22
 R. v. Guignard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 16, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, at para. 28. 
23
 Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] S.C.J. No. 63, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, at pa-
ra. 67. In the United States for example, “privacy” (for reasons peculiar to that country’s jurispru-
dence and history) has taken on an expansive meaning, well beyond the law governing state 
investigative activities and spawned a broad doctrine of “substantive privacy” which incorporates a 
right to make certain personal decisions (such as the use of contraceptives, abortion or non-harmful 
sexual acts in private: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 
438 (1972) (contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (sodomy).) At the same time a number of activities labelled “search” under the 
Canadian constitutional approach are considered unintrusive in the American context (e.g., consent 
intercepts (R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36) cf. and a variety of document 
searches (R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281; cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)). 
24
 R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 10 (emphasis added).  
25
 R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 18, citing Edwards, at 
para. 31, and R. v. Wong, supra, note 23, at 62. 
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in the influential 1972 report, Privacy and Computers.
26
 This approach 
to understanding the constitutional dimensions of privacy was first 
articulated on behalf of the Court in Dyment by La Forest J., writing: 
The first challenge, then, is to find some means of identifying those 
situations where we should be most alert to privacy considerations. 
Those who have reflected on the matter have spoken of zones or 
realms of privacy; see, for example, Privacy and Computers, …. The 
report classifies these claims to privacy as those involving territorial or 




The same approach to privacy has been accepted by the Ontario Com-
mission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy and by the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada: 
 The Ontario Commission… has identified three sorts of privacy: 
territorial, personal and informational. Territorial privacy is privacy in 
a spatial sense and involves the right to be free from uninvited entries 
or unwarranted intrusions into one’s home. Privacy of the person 
protects the dignity of the person and encompasses freedom from 
physical assault. Privacy in the information context concerns a 
person’s claim to control over personal information.
28
 
These “realms of privacy” identify the different exemplifications of 
the individual’s interest in being “left alone” by the state (and others). 
They are inherently valuable in and of themselves as manifestations of 
what the citizen can expect in a free and democratic society. As the 
Court said in Dagg, “…privacy is grounded on physical and moral au-
                                                                                                                                
26
 Canada, a Report of the Task Force established by the Department of Communications 
and the Department of Justice, Privacy and Computers (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972). The 
report has been repeatedly cited by this Honourable Court, most notably in R. v. Dyment, [1988] 
S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at para. 19, but also in R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 227 at para. 16ff; Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 42, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 841, at para. 51 by Iacobucci J. in dissent; Dagg v. Canada [2002], [1997] S.C.J. No. 63, 
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 403 at para. 65 (per LaForest J. dissenting); R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, 
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 and in R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, at para. 18ff. 
27
 Supra, note 26.  
28
 Law Reform Commission of Canada Report 33, Recodifying Criminal Procedure, Vol. 
1, “Police Powers” (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1991), at 118, adopting the 
comments of the Ontario Commission on Freedom of Information in Public Government for 
Private People, Vol. 3 “Protection of Privacy” (Toronto: Freedom of Information Commission 
(Ontario), 1980), at 498ff. 
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tonomy — the freedom to engage in one’s own thoughts, actions and 
decisions…”
29
 Each kind of privacy contributes to the underlying pur-
poses of privacy, the fostering of individual dignity and autonomy.  
Privacy is, as Binnie J. observes, a “protean” concept.
30
 In the con-
text of section 8, the best approach is, I would suggest, a purposive one. 
Why do we wish to protect privacy from the investigative agencies of 
government? This purposive assessment assists in understanding how 
privacy should be understood in the context of the legal rights provi-
sions of the Charter. If impugned state action occasions no meaningful 
harm to those interests then there is no need (at least under section 8) to 
constrain it.  
Protection of privacy is intended to contribute to the well-being of 
individuals and to society as a whole: total or perfect privacy is only 
achieved by the recluse who excises himself from all human intercourse 
to lead a completely atomistic life. A purposive approach to the issue 
examines privacy in terms of securing or enhancing individual dignity 
and autonomy within a community that is free and democratic. Our 
constitutional understanding of privacy must protect values and interests 
that contribute to how people conceive of themselves and their role in, 
and relationship to, such a community. Intrusions which involve no 
meaningful diminution of these underlying values ought not to be classi-
fied as searches. To do so would be to erect barriers to investigation just 
for the sake of creating a barrier, not to serve some other constitutional 
value. 
Expectations of informational privacy are generally the most chal-
lenging to identify and quantify. Participation in society necessarily 
means that information about ourselves flows constantly — our appear-
ance, social interactions, movements, and a variety of transactions with 
state and private actors who may cooperate with the police mean that a 
broad range of data is available to those who might be inclined to ob-
serve or record them.
31
  
                                                                                                                                
29
 Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), supra, note 26, at para. 65, per La Forest J. (dis-
senting in the result, for the majority on this point). 
30
 Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 25. For those (like me) who do not find themselves us-
ing the term every day, something is protean if it takes on varied shapes, forms, or meanings. 
31
 R. v. Elzein, [1993] Q.J. No. 802, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 455 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Bryntwick, 
[2002] O.J. No. 3618 (S.C.J.). 
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Not every acquisition of information can be characterized as a 
search. To do so would stifle legitimate police inquiries and create in-
vestigative gridlock. In Evans
32
 and again in Plant
33
 the Court cautioned 
against taking too broad an approach to what investigative actions might 
be constitutionally labelled as “searches”: 
The word “search” is defined by The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd 
ed. 1989), vol. XIV as: “1. a. The action or an act of searching; 
examination or scrutiny for the purpose of finding a person or 
thing....Also, investigation of a question; effort to ascertain 
something.” In this sense, every investigatory method used by the 
police will in some measure constitute a “search”. However, the scope 
of s. 8 is much narrower than that, and protects individuals only 
against police conduct which violates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. To hold that every police inquiry or question constitutes a 
search under s. 8 would disregard entirely the public’s interest in law 
enforcement in favour of an absolute but unrealistic right of privacy of 
all individuals against any state incursion however moderate.
34
 
Not every investigative technique is a search: “it is only where a per-
son’s reasonable expectations of privacy are somehow diminished by an 
investigatory technique that s. 8 of the Charter comes into play.”
35
  
Insofar as expectations of informational privacy are concerned, the 
Court (taking a purposive approach to a reasonable expectation of in-
formational privacy) has stated that in order to attract constitutional 
protection information should be at the “biographical core of personal 
information which individuals in a free and democratic society would 
wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state” and which, 
if disclosed, would “reveal intimate details” about the “personal life-
style or private decisions of the” subject.
36
  
In Plant, the leading section 8 case on expectations of informational 
privacy, the Court considered a form of information much like (indeed, 
if anything, more private than) the information in issue in Tessling. The 
police obtained access to the electricity consumption records of a par-
                                                                                                                                
32
 R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8. 
33
 R. v. Plant, supra, note 26. 
34
 R. v. Evans, supra, note 32, at para. 48 (emphasis added) per Major J. in dissent, but not 
on this issue (see Sopinka J., at para. 10). 
35
 R. v. Evans, id., at para. 11. 
36
 R. v. Plant, supra, note 26, at para. 20. 
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ticular home. The records would not, by themselves, disclose how the 
energy was used, who used it, or what was being done in the house, but 
could, when considered with other evidence, provide some insights into 
the goings on within the home. The information was not normally avail-
able to the public
37
 and the police only gained access through a special 
arrangement with the utility. The accused complained that by discover-
ing this information the state had trenched upon his expectation of in-
formational privacy. The majority in the Supreme Court of Canada 
disagreed, however, concluding that “electricity consumption reveals 
very little about the personal lifestyle or private decisions of the occu-
pant of the residence”
38
 and such does not give rise to a reasonable ex-
pectation of informational privacy. 
Our understanding of privacy in a constitutional context must, of 
course, be cast in terms of the relationship between the individual and 
the state, and the legal prohibitions on the state which flow from a con-
clusion that the activity in question is a “search.” As well, the test 
should be cast with reference to what citizens in a free and democratic 
society should be able to expect from their government, rather than what 
circumstances cause them to expect. In Wong, La Forest J. said: 
R. v. Duarte approached the problem of determining whether a person 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in given circumstances by 
attempting to assess whether, by the standards of privacy that persons 
can expect to enjoy in a free and democratic society, the agents of the 
state were bound to conform to the requirements of the Charter when 
effecting the intrusion in question. This involves asking whether the 
persons whose privacy was intruded upon could legitimately claim 
that in the circumstances it should not have been open to the agents of 
the state to act as they did without prior judicial authorization. To 
borrow from Professor Amsterdam’s reflections, ... the adoption of 
this standard invites the courts to assess whether giving their sanction 
to the particular form of unauthorized surveillance in question would 
see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens 




                                                                                                                                
37
 R. v. Plant, id., at para. 44 (though Sopinka J. seemed to take a different view of the evi-
dence). 
38
 R. v. Plant, id., at para. 20. 
39
 R. v. Wong, supra, note 23, at para. 12 (emphasis added). 





whether an individual’s privacy interests will attract s. 8 protection 
depends on whether a “reasonable person would expect that the 
investigative technique in question so trenched on personal privacy 




Considering privacy, or expectations of privacy, from a constitu-
tional perspective, one must consider the extent to which — if at all — 
the questioned government conduct would, if permitted without judicial 
pre-authorization, undermine the values of personal autonomy that are 
the underlying purpose of the privacy protection in section 8. I would 
suggest the following heuristic to assist in assessing whether such priva-
cy is being curtailed by government action: 
• Would the unauthorized use of the questioned investigative tech-
nique “see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens 
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and 
open society”?  
• Would it inhibit individuals from leading autonomous, meaningful 
lives independent of government meddling?  
• Would it impair the creation or development of networks of indi-
viduals in intimate, personal relationships?  
• Would it change the way we perceive our ability to participate in 
personal, family, community or political life? 
 
Any lesser test would radically lower the threshold for the identification 
of state conduct said to intrude on privacy and effectively place a search 
label on any investigative actions. Unintrusive state action to acquire 
even the most mundane data would become a search. It would amount 
to a trivialization of privacy as a constitutional concept and undermine 
the public’s perception of the balance between individual protection and 
the law’s ability to permit the police a reasonable ambit of activity to 
gather evidence of crime.  
                                                                                                                                
40
 Per Iacobucci J. dissenting in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. 
No. 42, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 841, at para. 49, quoting S.C. Hutchison, et al., Search and Seizure Law in 
Canada (1993) looseleaf at 1-12. 
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In Tessling one consideration was the “technological” concern: the 
fear that permitting the use of FLIR would be seen as a licence to use a 
range of as yet undreamed of technologies to surveil citizens. No doubt 
the courts carry a great trust for the future to ensure that approbation of 
a particular search does not become a licence for later, more intrusive 
activities. The challenge in the context of investigative techniques which 
involve the use of a technology is to craft a rule which does not uninten-
tionally invite the use of more advanced and more intrusive versions of 
the same technology at some future point in time. Clearly this was a 
concern for the Court of Appeal in Tessling and for Scalia J. in Kyllo.
41
 
But a concern for the careful development of the law is not a man-
date to lose sight of the case that is actually before the Court. The 
Court’s duty to the future is discharged not by ignoring the relatively 
mundane issue before it in a particular case (for example, gross 
measures of waste heat in Tessling), but by articulating a rule or test that 
is substantive rather than mechanical. There is no need to fear an FLIR 
device or any other similar device simply because it is a “technological” 
aid, so long as the test used to assess any alleged search is substantive. 
One can never lose sight of the need to examine whether there exists a 
reasonable expectation of privacy based on the facts actually before the 
court: “[T]he consideration of whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy can only be decided within the particular factual 
context of the surveillance”
42
 and not based on open-ended ideas about 
ideal privacy. 
Tessling is a natural product of the Court’s purposive development 
of a conception of privacy intended to foster other democratic values 
while permitting the state a range of investigative action not antagonistic 
to such values.  
It is argued that the police ought not to be able to engage in activi-
ties such as using FLIR because they might then be able to use that 
relatively neutral information, in conjunction with other investigative 
data, to draw some inference about activities in a house. Such an approach 
confuses an investigative conclusion with investigative intrusion. Police 
are expected to investigate and find out what is happening behind doors. 
Our concern should be with how they do this, not with the conclusions 
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or inferences they are able to justify based on what evidence they gather 
using otherwise unintrusive techniques. 
IV. POLICE CULTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
I have in the past joined in efforts to encourage the more complete 
and effective education of police officers and others on the constitution-
al limits of their powers.
43
 I also believe strongly that the notion of “in-
stitutional bad faith” at the section 24(2) stage is the appropriate way for 




But if the courts are to expect that the police will know and obey the 
law, then there is a concomitant obligation on the courts (and parlia-
ment) to make the law more accessible to those charged with its execu-
tion. Police disregard for the law may in part be a reaction to the 
growing perception that the law in this area has become “unknowable.” 
Search and seizure law is now profoundly complex and subtle. In 1982 
the annotated Criminal Code dedicated about seven and one-half pages 
to the core search provisions. The 2005 edition has more than 70 pages 




The Criminal Code search provisions are textually dense and in 
places almost unreadable.
46
 A good first step in improving police obedi-
ence of the law would be a thoughtful legislative overhaul of this morass 
of legislative and judicial authority.
47
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